


Latin America's Strategic Outlook: Populist Politics, Health Concerns, and Other Security Challenges



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Introduction

Professor Yonah Alexander

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Like any other world region, Latin America has faced two security challenges. The first stems from natural disasters, such as earthquakes and infectious diseases. The second consists of “man-made” threats including gangs, crime, terrorism, insurgency, and war triggered by internal and external adversaries.

Indeed, many factors have contributed to these dual security calamities. Aside from afflictions by Mother Nature, mention should be made of vulnerabilities created by porous borders; established smuggling routes; implementation of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism, Castroism, fascism, and right-wing ideological models; promoting dictatorships and military regimes; violating individual and collective human rights; weakening governmental institutions and the rule of law; sustaining corruption practices; and mismanaging scarce economic resources.

Some of the recent security-related concerns in Latin America include a landslide in Colombia in April that killed some 300 people;¹ protests surrounding Venezuela's Supreme Court ruling in March 2017 on the National Assembly's power² and Maduro's request for UN support to assist with medicine shortages;³ some 30 people killed in Brazil's Alcaçuz prison riot in January 2017;⁴ Fidel Castro's death in November 2016;⁵ Colombia-FARC peace deal that was reached in November 2016, though it was initially rejected by referendum a few weeks before;⁶ Brazilian President Rousseff's removal from office in August 2016;⁷ an earthquake in Ecuador that killed over 650 people in April 2016;⁸ journalists publishing the “Panama Papers” in April 2016;⁹ 52 dead in a February 2016 Mexico prison riot;¹⁰ Venezuela's declaration of an economic emergency in January 2016;¹¹ and, in that same month, the assassination of a Mexico City mayor one day after taking office.¹²

The current report on “Latin America's Strategic Outlook: Populist Politics, Health Concerns, and Other Security Challenges” deals with security-related developments in 2016 such as the Rio Olympics, the Zika epidemic, and post-Castro-era assessments. Details are provided within the next segment.

¹ <http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=12393&ArticleId=2434268>

² <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/protests-venezuela-restores-power-congress/>

³ <http://laht.com/article.asp?CategoryId=10717&ArticleId=2433442>

⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/15/brazil-prison-riot-alcacuz-drug-gang>

⁵ <http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/26/americas/fidel-castro-obit/index.html>

⁶ <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-37965392>

⁷ https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-impeached-removed-president.html?_r=0

⁸ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecuador-quake-idUSKCN0XK0GQ>

⁹ <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-are-the-panama-papers-2016-4>

¹⁰ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/11/dozens-killed-in-prison-riot-in-monterrey-mexico>

¹¹ <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-economy-idUSKCN0UT2ER>

¹² <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/opinion/sunday/why-cartels-are-killing-mexico-mayors.html>

An Academic Context

The Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (which is administered by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute) has provided an intellectual context for many of the historical and contemporary security challenges in Latin America. For instance, over the past two decades, the IUCTS, in collaboration with universities, think tanks, professional institutions, and public affairs bodies, as well as with governmental and intergovernmental organizations, initiated numerous lectures, briefings, seminars, and conferences in the region and in the United States. The following selected activities represent the nature of these undertakings:

- Seminar, "Preventing WMD Terrorism: Past Lessons and Future Outlook" (2017)
- Seminar, "Latin America's Security Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-Castro Era" (2016)
- Seminar, "Latin American Security Challenges: From the Olympics to Zika" (2016)
- Seminar, "Populist Politics: From Protests to Violence" (2016)
- Seminar, "The Refugee Crisis: Humanitarian and Security Implications" (2016)
- Seminar, "Terrorism Victimization of Women and Children: Costs, Lessons, and Future Outlook" (2015)
- Seminar, "Latin America Post-Chavez: Quo Vadis?" (2013)
- Briefing, "Terrorism and Latin America: Threats and Responses" (2011)
- Seminar, "Venezuelistan: Iran's Latin American Ambitions" (2010)
- Conference, "Latin America's Security Challenges in the 21st Century" (2009)
- Ambassadors' Roundtable Series with Mexican Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan (2008)
- Ambassadors' Forum on "Colombia" with Ambassador Carolina Barco Isakson (2007)
- Lectures and briefings, "International Terrorism" (2005) in Brazil
- Lectures and briefings, "Terrorism: Threats and Responses" (2004) in Argentina
- Seminar, "Terrorism Post- 9/11 and Latin America: A View from Peru" (2002)
- Seminar, "Counter Terrorism Strategies for the 21st Century: Latin American Perspectives" (1999)

Drawing from the foregoing and other research-related activities, several publications were produced. A report on "Counter Terrorism Strategies for the 21st Century: Latin American Perspectives" was published by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies in 1999. It included topics such as the "The Role of Multinational Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism" by Dr. Camilo Granada, "Colombia's Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Forces?" by David Spencer, "Legal Issues in Colombia" by Dr. Miguel Ceballos-Averalo, "Intelligence and Subversion in Peru" by Professor Alberto Bolivar, "Two Different Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Latin America: Islamic Groups and the Sendero in Peru" by James L. Zackrisson, and "Narco-Trafficking and Economic Sanctions" by Bruce Zagaris.

The second publication on *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries* (published by the University of Michigan Press, 2002) was edited by Professor Yonah

Alexander with a foreword by R. James Woolsey, former director of the CIA. This book included chapters on “Argentina” by Roger Fontaine, “Peru” by Professor Alberto Bolivar, and “Colombia” by James Zackrison.

The third publication, based on the conference “Latin America’s Security Challenges in the 21st Century,” was released in 2009 and consisted of contributions from the moderators Professor Yonah Alexander and Dan Mariaschin and from the speakers, including Ambassador Arturo Sarukhan (Mexican Ambassador to the United States), Ambassador Carolina Barco (Colombian Ambassador to the United States and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia), Ambassador Luis Diego Escalante (Costa Rican Ambassador to the United States), Rep. Eliot L. Engel (member of the U.S. House of Representatives and Chairman, House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs), and Ambassador Javier Rupérez (former Spanish Ambassador to the United States and former Executive Director of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee).

The fourth publication was a conference report in 2010 on “Venezuelistan: Iran’s Latin American Ambitions,” produced by the Hudson Institute and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. The participants included Ken Weinstein, Dan Mariaschin, Professor Yonah Alexander, Ambassador Jaime Daremblum, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Boris Saavedra, Professor Alberto Bolivar, and Professor Manochehr Dorraj.

The fifth publication, on “Latin America’s Security Challenges in the 21st Century,” published in 2014, was comprised of a preface by Professor Yonah Alexander and contributions from Professor Alberto Bolivar, Ambassador (ret.) Roger Noriega, Professor Monica Arruda De Almeida, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Boris Saavedra, Fernando Jimenez, and Dan Mariaschin.

The current publication is a report on “Latin America’s Strategic Outlook: Populist Politics, Health Concerns, and Other Security Challenges” that includes contributions from invited panelists at three separate seminars. The first presentation is from Abraham Stein (former Deputy Secretary for Multidimensional Security and Senior Advisor to the Secretary General on Defense and Hemispheric Security, Organization of American States) who spoke at an event on “Populist Politics: From Protests to Violence” held on May 10, 2016 at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

The second presenters include Professor Gary Simon (Director, Division of Infectious Diseases, Medical Faculty Associates, The George Washington University); Professor S. Gerald Sandler (Professor of Medicine and Pathology at Georgetown University Medical Center and Medical Director of the Blood Transfusion Service, MedStar Georgetown University Hospital, Washington, DC); Dr. Asha M. George (Co-Director of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense); and Dr. Tara Kirk Sell (member of the USA national swim team for eight years; served as captain for six national teams, and earned a silver medal at the 2004 Olympics in Athens. Currently, an associate at the Center for Health Security at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center) who participated at a seminar on “Latin American Security Challenges: From the Olympics to Zika” held on June 23, 2016 at the International Law Institute.

The third event was on “Latin America’s Security Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-Castro Era” held on December 16, 2016 at the Potomac

Institute for Policy Studies and included Professor Margaret Hayes (former Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at National Defense University, senior staff on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and visiting fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses. She also held appointments at Johns Hopkins University and George Mason University. Currently, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and Vice President of Evidence Based Research, Inc.); Diana Villiers Negroponte, Esq. and Ph.D. (Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Chair of the Wilson Council); Bruce Zagaris, Esq. (partner at Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP specializing in international criminal law as well as regulatory and enforcement aspects. His practice includes counseling in Latin America and other regions to individuals, entities, and governments. Since 1985 he has edited the International Enforcement Law Reporter), and Fernando Jimenez, Esq. (former legal advisor to the Inter-American Development Bank and Governor of the Basque Country in Spain. Currently, Director of TecnoLegal Consult LLC).

Acknowledgements

Some acknowledgements are in order. Deep appreciation is due to Michael S. Swetnam (CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies); General (ret.) Alfred Gray (twenty-ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies); and Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman, International Law Institute) for their inspiration and continuing support of our academic work in the field of global security concerns.

As always, Sharon Layani, Research Associate and Coordinator at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, deserves special gratitude for her professional research, publication support, and management of our team of interns during the spring 2017 semester, including Allison Davis (University of California, Davis), Ryan Dunbar (University of California, Los Angeles), Connor Garvey (The Catholic University of America), Soomin Jung (State University of New York at Albany), Ghislain Lunven (Sciences Po, Paris), Isaac Shorser (American University), and Benton Waterous (American University).

Finally, the IUCTS is currently developing a new project on "Latin American Security Challenges." The rationale and purpose of this undertaking are as follows: there is a need to analyze and to educate policy-makers and the public in general on the nature and intensity of these threats and their new manifestations of terrorism in Latin America. As a member of the academic and research community, the IUCTS has an intellectual obligation, as well as a moral and practical responsibility, to participate in the international effort to eliminate the threats of terrorism and international organized crime.

Hence, the topics currently under study for this project are: organized crime human trafficking, narco-trafficking, arms trafficking, terrorism, insurgency, energy security, maritime security, WMD, cyber security, health security, border security, financial crimes, legal responses, law enforcement, the role of the military, and international cooperation. It is hoped that related research and subsequent publications will encourage further study of Latin American concerns.

Populist Politics

Abraham Stein

*Former Deputy Secretary for Multidimensional Security and Senior Advisor to the Secretary General on Defense and Hemispheric Security, Organization of American States**

When street protests forced Guatemala's president to step down in the fall of 2015 during a corruption scandal, it seemed a rare break in a long and lucrative tradition of impunity in Latin America. A lot of people thought that a Latin American or at least a Central American Spring had begun; well, yes and no.

Today in Latin America, democracy has become the norm. Cuba is the only dictatorship remaining. The authoritarian regimes of Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia are on the defensive. Brazil, Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico as well as many others are ruled by democratic governments. And those democracies, despite their deficiencies, tend to be more liberal than conservative. It is hard to imagine a military coup taking place. (Well, remember Honduras?) Also, in contrast to the 1980s, today human rights are often mentioned and we are more likely to hear about civil rights, but still, we have a very long way to go on the implementation of the rule of law. Corruption has become a key issue, as demonstrated dramatically by events in Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, and Mexico. The political context is very different than it was in 1980.

Women have significantly expanded their influence in politics: Bachelet, Kirchner, Chamorro, Rousseff, and Chinchilla are clear examples. At the same time, women increasingly occupy leadership positions *below* the level of chief executive in both the political arena and the economy.

Latin American populism is at the end of its recent cycle of popularity. In Venezuela, the death of Chávez gave way to the disastrous administration of Nicolás Maduro. Bad economic policies threaten the expansion of social rights, while political rights and the existence of an independent press continue to be nonexistent. This combination of crisis and repression makes President Nicolás Maduro's regime more akin to classical left wing authoritarian regimes.

In Bolivia, Evo Morales suffered a historic defeat in the referendum held February 21, 2016, in which he was seeking the support of the citizens in order to pass a constitutional reform that would have enabled him to run again in 2019 for a new presidential term ending in 2025.

This is the third consecutive defeat for parties in power in South America in recent months: The first was the defeat suffered by Kirchnerismo in the presidential elections in Argentina in November 2015 (after 12 years in power), the second that of Chavismo in Venezuela's legislative elections on December 6, 2015, after 17 years of exercising absolute control over the National Assembly.

* This presentation was delivered at an event on "Populist Politics: From Protests to Violence" held on May 10, 2016, at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

Everything appears to indicate that the new economic cycle is characterized by a marked economic slowdown, especially in South America. Citizens' weariness with the "long administrations" (many of which have been in power for more than a decade) and the attrition they have suffered as a result, in addition to the new demands for more transparency and accountability, repudiation of corruption, and the demand for better quality public services, are giving rise to the beginning of a new political-electoral cycle in which, in contrast to the recent past, change and alternation in power are now carrying the day.

What does appear to be ever clearer is that the winds of change and of alternation of power are beginning to blow more forcefully in the region, especially in South America; and that the age of the hyper-presidents is winding down. People are increasingly informed, empowered, and demanding. They are exercising their right to vote and participating in non-violent mobilizations in the streets. The use of social media (Morales blamed it for his defeat) is placing clear limits on the efforts of these presidents to centralize their power and attempt to remain in power indefinitely.

Nonetheless, I would like to be careful in this analysis. We will have to wait and see the developments in the U.S. political arena during this election. Different results could trigger scenarios difficult to predict. Consequently, the importance of monitoring the next presidential elections very closely, not only those scheduled for 2016 (Peru, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua) but also those to be held in 2017 and 2018, in particular in Ecuador, Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela (if the Venezuelan elections are not called earlier as a result of the current economic crisis and the clash of branches of government between the executive and the opposition).

Only after these elections, and in light of their results, will we be in a position to better understand the characteristics and trends of the new political-electoral cycle that are emerging in Latin America.

In additions, we cannot ignore the economic and trade partnership that just took effect:

The Pacific Alliance member countries – Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru – welcome the entry into force of the Additional Protocol to the Framework Agreement, signed in Cartagena, Colombia, on February 10, 2014.

This Protocol is a fundamental commercial tool to move towards the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people among the four countries. The agreement provides tariff liberalization of 92 percent of trade in the Pacific Alliance (PA), as well as liberalization on the remaining eight percent in the short and medium term. Its objective is to achieve free movement of goods among these countries by 2030.

The Protocol, in its 19 chapters, facilitates regional trade, removes trade barriers, and establishes modern discipline with regard to professional, maritime, telecommunications, and electronic commerce services.

The Pacific Alliance is an example of a forward-looking integration initiative whose goals are in line with the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP).

2015 proved to be a rewarding year for the United States in many respects with regard to Latin America. That said, not all news will be good news for Washington and Latin America: Despite the formal normalization of ties with Cuba, the United States is unlikely to fully lift its embargo on the country in 2016, since the move would require congressional approval in an election year. At the same time, the Venezuelan opposition's latest win will not mean that Caracas suddenly becomes friendly with the United States, though deeper economic cooperation between the two is a possibility if Venezuela's financial climate continues to deteriorate. Elsewhere in Latin America, major powers such as Brazil and Argentina will seek closer trade ties with the United States to stimulate their sluggish economies. Again, though, political constraints and cultural differences will keep this from translating into the full adoption of a U.S.-style open economic system. But again, like many Mexicans, a lot of people down south think that Trump's aggressive rhetoric and alarming xenophobia could result in a disastrous relation between USA and Latin America, especially for Mexico.

The Rio Olympics and the Zika Epidemic

Professor Gary Simon

*Director, Division of Infectious Diseases, Medical Faculty Associates, The George Washington University**

I work on infectious diseases. There is nothing better than infectious diseases. There is always something new.

Zika is both old and new. The Zika virus was first discovered in a monkey in the late 1940s in the Zika Forest outside of Entebbe, Uganda. The first human case was not recognized until 1952. At that point it appeared to be a mild self-limited viral infection that resolved without sequelae within a week. Most likely it would not be a topic of interest to the general public except for the recently described complications of infection.

Zika is spread by mosquitos, primarily two species of mosquitos, *Aedes aegypti* which is the predominant vector, and *Aedes albopictus*. Both are present in the United States although the latter has a more extensive range. *Aedes albopictus* can be found as far north as Maine. Parenthetically, one may contemplate the role of mosquitos in the environment. They provide food for bats and some birds. On the other hand, mosquitos are responsible for the most common lethal infectious disease in the world, malaria which is spread by the anopheles mosquito. Mosquitos are also the vectors of many other infectious diseases, dengue, Chikungunya, yellow fever, La Crosse encephalitis, Eastern Equine encephalitis, Japanese B encephalitis. The list goes on and on.

At first Zika appeared to be limited to East Africa, then it spread to West Africa, and then to Southeast Asia. There was a significant outbreak in Thailand after which it next appeared in Micronesia. And, at that point, it appeared to have mutated a bit, because there were some complications in Micronesia – Yap Island and other places – that had not been seen or recorded before, and that was primarily Guillain-Barré syndrome, which we will talk about in a few minutes. It then spread to the Americas, and there were more complications. It is not clear that there were any further mutations since its spread from Micronesia to the Americas, but that is not 100 percent clear at this point.

There are several problems associated with Zika besides the really awful complications that have been associated with Zika infections. First, it is actually a hard diagnosis to establish: fever, rash, arthralgia, conjunctivitis. It is almost indistinguishable from dengue, which is very common in the Caribbean and South America, and chikungunya which was a Southeast Asian virus which also spread to the same region, and by mosquitos. There are more arthralgias and muscle aches in dengue and chikungunya, and a little bit more of a rash from Zika. The presence of conjunctivitis is more common with Zika infection. But, just looking at an individual patient, it may be hard to tell the difference between these conditions. And, as I will

* This presentation was delivered at an event on “Latin American Security Challenges: From the Olympics to Zika” held on June 23, 2016, at the International Law Institute.

come to, there is really no good test, or at least no *simple*, good test to distinguish one from the other.

The diagnosis can actually be made by detecting the virus in the blood of an infected patient. This test, a polymerase chain reaction or PCR, is available at one commercial lab and will soon be available at others. The problem with this test is it will detect virus when it is in the blood, which is usually only during the first week or so of illness. In some cases it may detect the virus in blood up to two weeks after infection and even a bit longer in urine. But, once the virus is no longer present in body fluids, the test will not reveal the diagnosis. Unfortunately, many people who have been to an endemic area and are worried once they return home may not be tested in time to detect the presence of virus. Moreover, to further complicate the matter, 80 percent of the people that have been infected with Zika are asymptomatic. This means that a woman who was in an endemic area, never became ill, but discovers she is pregnant three weeks or so after returning home cannot be assured she was not infected, with the currently commercially available test. Once a patient has passed the period in which the virus can be detected by PCR, it becomes necessary to do a different test. We can then test for antibody to the virus. Ordinarily, testing for antibody is rather simple. But, this is a little more complicated. Zika, like dengue, and many other viruses, is a flavivirus, and the simple testing of antibody for Zika will be falsely positive if the patient had dengue. So, a more sophisticated test needs to be done. This is a plaque reduction neutralization test. It is very labor intensive, and no commercial laboratory is doing it at this point. In those cases where this test is warranted, a sample can be sent to the state laboratory and then it can either be done there or forwarded to the CDC where the latter will do the test. At this point, we don't know if the risk of transmission of Zika to the fetus is greater, lesser, or the same in asymptomatic pregnant women, as compared to women who have the acute illness.

Zika for most people is a minor illness, even for those who are symptomatic. You get sick with a flu-like syndrome for a few days and you get better and that's the end of it. There is almost nothing to worry about in that case. Almost, but we can talk about that later. But, clearly, it can be a devastating illness for those who get one of the complications associated with this illness. Obviously, microcephaly is a tragic complication. Children born with microcephaly have considerable brain damage and will never gain full function. However, what about children who are infected in utero, but do not have microcephaly, or infected in utero late in the third trimester. Do they have more subtle neurologic damage? Is there a loss of cognitive capacity? This may not be known for several years. It may require sophisticated testing, comparing siblings who are born before and after Zika. Another complication is Guillain-Barré (GBS) syndrome. This usually manifests itself as an ascending paralysis. Sensation is intact, but the paralysis begins in the lower extremities and moves up the body. If it gets high enough, it can impact the diaphragmatic muscles so that the patient needs to be put on a respirator. Rarely, the cranial nerves are involved and there is a rare form in which the paralysis descends. Most people with GBS recover, although it may take weeks to months; and there may be some residual symptoms. There are treatment options for GBS. Plasmapheresis is a procedure in which we filter the blood for the purpose of removing the offending agent— in this case antibody — and people get better faster. An alternative approach which is probably not quite as effective is to administer immunoglobulin intravenously.

Right now there is no treatment for the Zika virus infection, and it is not clear that treatment would alter the subsequent outcome. People get better, but at what point in the course of the illness does the virus cross the placenta? And at what point in the course of the illness do the antibodies develop such that a patient is at risk for Guillain-Barré syndrome? These are unknowns.

The antibody issue is a critical question. In the case of microcephaly the pathogenesis appears to be associated with direct invasion of the central nervous system by the virus. The virus has been demonstrated in the fetal brain after miscarriage or therapeutic abortion. Guillain-Barré is different. Guillain-Barré is caused by an antibody that binds to peripheral nerves and through one of several potential mechanisms damages the nerve such that an ascending paralysis develops. Most likely it is binding to a Schwann cell. These are cells that are on the surface of the actual nerve or axon and promote transmission of nerve impulses. The purpose of plasmapheresis is to remove these antibodies from the circulation and thus allow the Schwann cell to slowly repair itself. It is generally believed that this antibody is a "cross-reacting antibody." That means that the antibody which the body makes in response to a Zika infection is in response to a certain structure on or in the Zika virus. This structure is termed an antigen. The concept of a cross-reacting antibody is that the anti-Zika antibody detects a structure on the Schwann cell (or the neuron for that matter) that looks similar to the Zika antigen and thus may bind to the Schwann cell. This can then lead to cellular damage by several different mechanisms.

Why is this a critical issue? We are trying to develop a vaccine that will prevent Zika infection. But, what if the vaccine produces an antibody that is identical to the antibody that binds to the peripheral nerve – it is possible that GBS could occur. This will require careful testing before a vaccine can be released for general use.

Is there a precedent for this? Yes. About 40 years ago, when Gerald Ford was president, there was an outbreak of swine flu at Fort Dix in New Jersey. Swine flu is the specific strain of influenza that led to the great outbreak in 1918 when 50 million people died worldwide. Obviously, the outbreak at Fort Dix was a big issue. A vaccine was developed for that particular strain of influenza virus which, like other influenza vaccines, was given to millions of individuals across the country. That year there was a statistically significantly increased incidence of GBS syndrome associated with that particular vaccine. Ironically, the swine outbreak never got out of Fort Dix. But because of that outbreak many people still do not take the influenza vaccine. Since that outbreak there has never been an increase in GBS associated with influenza vaccine administration. Nevertheless, there are still many who fear the influenza vaccine. And, by the way, you cannot get the flu from the influenza vaccine, because there is no whole virus in the injectable vaccine.

Obviously, this raises some concern about a vaccine for Zika and the potential for an adverse effect associated with that vaccine because of a vaccine-induced antibody-mediated reaction.

The Olympics are coming to Rio de Janeiro. Mosquitos like temperatures above 80 degrees. The median-high temperature in Rio in August is 78 degrees. I am not sure how sensitive mosquitos are to the difference between 78 and 80. I am also not so sure

that the median temperature is going to stay at that level. On the other hand, most of the time mosquitos will not be very active because the temperature will be below 80. Mosquitos are not as prevalent in Rio as they are in northeastern Brazil, which is equatorial. It is unlikely that any outbreak of Zika will be as bad in Rio as it has been in the more equatorial regions of Brazil. So whether Rio is going to be a problem or not depends on the temperature in Rio, as well as a number of other factors. But I do not think it is 100 percent safe, and I am certainly not recommending anyone who is pregnant or thinking about getting pregnant or thinking about impregnating his wife should be going there. Zika is a legitimate concern, and each athlete will have to make his or her own decision

Earlier I stated that once you have Zika and you have recovered, and if you were not pregnant and did not get Guillain-Barré, there is almost nothing to worry about. Almost. It turns out the virus has been found in semen up to six months after infection. Right now, the CDC is recommending that men wait six months before having unprotected sex and women wait eight weeks. Is that long enough? We don't know.

What about DEET? We all know about DEET. Smear your body with DEET, and the mosquitos stay away. Well, one of my colleagues went down to Colombia – we are currently collaborating with the Colombians because of the widespread occurrence of Guillain-Barré in that country – and she came back on a plane with two other people, and she said she was covered with DEET. DEET is supposed to keep mosquitoes off you. It is a spray or a liquid solution. You can get 25 percent DEET in sprays; she was using a 40 percent liquid. She was covered with DEET, and the mosquitos were still biting her on the plane. And the person she came back with, one of her colleagues, tested positive for Zika. Whether he got it on the plane or while in Columbia is not known. But the other message associated with this little story is that just as people fly from South America or the Caribbean, so do mosquitos.

One of the favorite approaches that our public health people like to do is model an infection to predict how serious it can be. How many people will get infected? How many will develop a complication, etc. Modeling is very difficult and frequently very inaccurate. When the CDC modeled Ebola in September of 2014, it said that by January there could be as many as 1.4 million cases of Ebola virus. By the time the epidemic ended there were 28,000 cases, of which only 16,000 were proven Ebola.

Currently, there is an estimate that somewhere between one percent and 13 percent of women who are infected with Zika will transmit it to the fetus. It is likely that the level of complication depends on when an individual is infected: first trimester, second trimester, and so on. First trimester most likely carries the highest risk of microcephaly. One month ago, there were 117 births from Zika-infected women in the United States, of which there was six cases of Zika malformations. As of the last week in July there were 1658 cases of Zika in the continental United States of which 15 were sexually transmitted. There have been 433 pregnant women with Zika who have been identified and there have been 13 deliveries in which there were congenital abnormalities and six additional cases of either stillborn or aborted fetuses with congenital abnormalities. Since not all of the pregnant women have delivered, it is difficult to estimate what percentage of these pregnancies will result in a congenital abnormality. Since this talk was given there have been 10 cases of endemic

transmission of Zika in Florida. It is likely that the virus may be found in donated blood and it will be necessary to test blood for Zika virus before transfusions in endemic regions.

We are dealing with small numbers without a clear picture of the numerator or denominator. We don't know how many people, especially pregnant women, are infected. Remember that 80 percent of infections are asymptomatic. And we do not begin to know what the numerator really is. How many of the 433 women who are infected with the virus will have congenitally infected offspring? I have seen the number 29 percent if infection occurs in the first trimester. That seems rather high, but it's hard to get good data at this point.

Clearly the complication of microcephaly is terrible, but even though we do not know what the extent of this outbreak will be or whether there will be significant endemic spread, we cannot simply shut our eyes and hope for the best. We have to be prepared for what could be a devastating outbreak.

The mosquitoes that transmit it in this hemisphere – it was the *Aedes africanus* in Africa – but in this hemisphere it is *Aedes aegypti* which is the primary vector. *Aedes aegypti* is not very prevalent in Washington, DC, but *Aedes albopictus*, which is a secondary vector, can be found as far north as Maine. So yes, there is risk even here. So if you have a bird bath at home, empty it, because they like standing water.

One last political comment: the CDC initially stated that it would only test symptomatic women. Since 80 percent of infections are asymptomatic, it did not seem reasonable to restrict this test to only those pregnant woman who were in the endemic region, but were symptomatic. Less than 48 hours later the CDC announced that it would test asymptomatic women as well. I like to think that the call I placed to my congressman had an impact on that.

Professor S. Gerald Sandler

*Professor of Medicine and Pathology at Georgetown University Medical Center and
Medical Director of the Blood Transfusion Service, MedStar Georgetown University
Hospital, Washington, DC**

I am a blood doctor (hematologist, transfusion medicine specialist), and whenever we experience a new epidemic one of the first questions people ask is, “What do I do if I need a blood transfusion?” And, as was asked before, “Is Zika an infection that is transmitted from an infected person to a transfusion recipient?” The answer to that is clearly “Yes.” Transmission is estimated to be at least 40 to 50 percent efficient, but since we do not have a reliable laboratory test and there is very little information, that estimate is not very strong. Zika is clearly an infection that is transmitted by blood, and there are cases already.

So the questions that come up with regard to security and the safety of a blood transfusion at the Summer Olympics in Rio are: one, will Brazilian authorities take the initiative of testing their local supply of blood for the Zika virus using an investigational-level test? As you just heard, there is no reliable test kit commercially available that would be easy to implement. The issue of blood transfusion is that blood does not treat any disease; it supports the treatment. So, when we ask, “Should the blood supply be tested?” – let us say for Zika – we are looking at a small segment within the broader issue of dengue, chikungunya, yellow fever, HIV, all of the potential infections that could be there. We have the big question – the whole healthcare issue. How do we prioritize for blood transfusion in that context?

The second question is, “Is it feasible to consider applying the CDC and FDA recommendations that have been issued for the United States?” For the United States, the CDC recommendation is as follows: in an area where there is active mosquito-borne transmission of Zika virus – and we do not have that yet in the United States but it is coming – when that happens, the plan will be to import blood from regions of the United States that do not have active mosquito-borne transmission. Is it in any way feasible to consider applying the CDC recommendation for the United States and bring it to Brazil and say, “Well, there is active mosquito-borne infection in Rio; let’s ship a supply of blood from Maine or Minnesota – somewhere where there is no Zika – to Rio”? I was contemplating that option two days ago when my hospital and every hospital in the United States received a letter from the senior vice president of the American Red Cross Biomedical Services. What that letter says is that blood suppliers across the United States, including the American Red Cross, are already in June, experiencing significant blood shortages and the shortage is expected to last throughout the entire summer.

I am medical director for the transfusion service at MedStar Georgetown University Hospital. I can tell you we were counting the units of blood in the refrigerator last night because we were experiencing a very low inventory. No one on the other end of the telephone said, “I can ship you a replacement supply.” So we are already at borderline levels of blood for transfusion in the nation’s capital. There is no way that you could take a significant amount of blood for transfusion out of the United States

* This presentation was delivered at an event on “Latin American Security Challenges: From the Olympics to Zika” held on June 23, 2016, at the International Law Institute.

today and send it to Rio. If requested to do so, I would respond, "You better keep the blood people in this community are giving to help our sick people here, because our supply is borderline and we can't put our own patients at risk."

In short, the issue of transfusion safety in Rio is a small factor in of the much larger issue of how Brazil manages its healthcare system. I have no evidence that Brazilian blood banks are planning to import an investigational test and test all of the blood that might be needed for a blood transfusion. Count the number of people expected to attend the Summer Olympics in Rio and multiply that number by the incidence of transfusions that are given to a population of that size and you'll arrive a larger number of units of blood than can be supplied from outside Rio in August 2016. There is no way to have a sufficient supply of pre-tested blood of all ABO/Rh types in Rio in the event of unexpected – but what we are here to consider – terrorist activities with mass casualties.

We cannot bring the American standard to Rio. That is the heart of the issue. I recall the "ugly American" who went into a hotel in Rome and observed that everything was different from the United States said "Gee, we do it differently in the States and that is what I want." If you want to go to Rio, go to Rio for Rio. Rio is going to remain Rio as far as blood and healthcare are concerned. I cannot predict that blood transfusion and healthcare, in general, in Rio will meet the standard of the United States in August 2016. Rio's healthcare system is going to stay where it is and if you want to go to Rio, go to Rio for the experience of Rio. Unless something that is beyond my vision is going to happen, I think we can expect the status quo to remain as it exists in Rio's local healthcare system. With specific reference to transfusion safety, it will remain for transients as it is for locals.

Dr. Asha M. George

*Co-Director of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense**

I want to tell you just a little bit about the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense, because I think it is worthwhile understanding it in a non-academic context. We pulled together the Study Panel because we felt that it had been a while since a commission of any sort had really evaluated the state of biodefense in the United States of America. We do not have a congressional mandate. We did not get congressional funding or governmental funding otherwise. A group of former Capitol Hill and White House staff members came together and said, "This is something we think we need to do." We are all biodefense experts, and we decided we wanted to do this, and we did.

After we made that decision, we went and got co-chairs – Senator Lieberman and former Secretary of Homeland Security, Governor Tom Ridge. We have former Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala, former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, former Homeland Security advisor Ken Wainstein, and former Representative Jim Greenwood, who are all members of the panel. We also have some ex-officios, including Dr. Yonah Alexander, and institutional sponsorship or support from Hudson Institute, Potomac Institute, and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies.

Now I am bringing this up not because it is so vastly exciting to hear about how we brought it together administratively, but rather to encourage people who are here who have issues in this arena and in other arenas that they think are important, to get a group of people together and figure out whether you can attract enough luminaries to address an issue the way we did. It was possible for us and I think it is possible for you as well.

Now the Study Panel examined biodefense in the United States of America looking across a broad set of activities. We went all the way from prevention (including intelligence activities and diplomatic activities) to response and recovery, mitigation, law enforcement, and attribution. So as you can imagine, it is just this huge group of activities, all kinds of things to look at. We released a report in October of 2015 which has 33 recommendations and about 50 very specific action items.

Now we have academics here, the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center is here, the military is represented, and we have a lot of activity going on in the academic and non-governmental realms. Why do we need a commission to assess the situation? What I want to say is, with us, we very much, given our own backgrounds in Congress and in the White House and in the Executive Branch otherwise, we really wanted to focus on how does government facilitate actually defending the United States against something, and in this case it is against the biological threat. How well are we doing that?

So our recommendations are different than what you usually find in the academic arena. And as a result they were, as we would have expected, of great interest to

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Congress and to the White House and to the Executive Branch. This was because of the way we wrote these, it was very easy for them to take a recommendation and say, "Oh, now I know how to write about this in legislation." I think it is really important because in this arena, there is so much in it and there is so much in the way of blind spots people may want to address, and they do not know how to address it. It gets exhausting and then they give up and they say, "Okay, we are going to focus over here because nuclear is a big deal and we all understand it." It is a challenge, and in order to get people to do something about it what we have found is that you have to get really specific and say, "This is exactly what we recommend that you do about it," and have a conversation at that level.

I just want to bring up a few points for you all to consider. This issue of blind spots – I would tell you the whole realm of biodefense seems to be blind spots. But it is really fascinating when you start looking at it from an academic perspective how different things overlap and how rapidly something like biodefense becomes very complicated. We have all kinds of activity going on in this one arena that we do not understand. We do not necessarily understand the nature of the diseases that we are dealing with; we do not know where all the biological agents are that were produced by former biological warfare programs elsewhere in the world. We are watching things like antibiotic resistance occur. We know in the scientific community we are already ourselves modifying organisms. There is so much of that going on.

But in addition, we also have other things happening. Here is just one small example with counterfeit pharmaceuticals. In many countries counterfeiting is not an issue for them. It is not illegal for them. They encourage it. They think it is the way to go. Why? Because they are trying to—they do not want to counterfeit and kill people, that is not their issue—they are trying to get ahead in terms of the science. They are taking something that already exists and saying, "Okay, go copy it, go do this." Now, you can tell from a health perspective this is not something we want to see happen. But when you have countries that have those kinds of vastly different perspectives on something like counterfeiting, how can you even have a conversation about that? It is an enormous challenge, and that is just one thing that has something to do with biodefense.

Now the other issue I want to bring up, just quickly, has to do with intelligence and the intelligence enterprise. We have the tendency to think that every threat to the United States is addressed as equally and as well as every other threat, and that is not the case, and not just for biological issues but for other areas, especially when you do get very technical and the fields are moving fast, fast, fast, fast. I think, as a country and as a government, we recognize, of course, there are challenges, weaknesses, and gaps and all that, and we take steps to address those. For example, with the Western Hemisphere, the Intelligence Community said, "We are kind of weak on this. We hear from the State Department and the Defense Department that we need some emphasis here." So they created something called the National Intelligence Manager for the Western Hemisphere, which is great and allowed for some additional focus. Now, I am sure the Ambassador would say it is not perfect, and it has not addressed every single problem. But at least we brought it up another level and someone in the Intelligence Community, namely the Director of National Intelligence, said, "Hey, we need some additional focus." So we are advocating the same thing as far as the biological threat is concerned.

Now I think that we have to get to the point – and one of the things that the Study Panel argues is that we have to get to the point – where we develop processes and changes in our culture, both inside the government and outside the government, to deal with really messy, complicated, gap-filled challenges like addressing the biological threat and others. We have to get to that point, otherwise we will just keep backing off and focusing on something else until something comes up, like Zika or Ebola or whatever else. I do not think we can keep going down that path over and over and over again.

When we look at Zika, we just heard the history of Zika, we did not just discover it last week or last month, we have been tracking it for a while. We have known it, we have seen it, we have looked at it. We have identified some aspects of it, not every aspect, but some aspects of it. So we, the Study Panel, and you now sitting in the audience, we have to ask ourselves why, if we were tracking it all this time, not since last week, not even since last year, but going back decades, why is it that last night Congress passed emergency supplemental funding to address Zika now that it is a big emergency? Why did it go that way, and why did it happen with Ebola before that? And why does it happen every year with pandemic influenza when it becomes a big issue that we are all concerned about? Why? Part of it is because I think we are just in the habit, as a government, of doing that, and part of it is that the trade-offs are exhausting and important. We are not talking about, “Oh, you know, I do not know if we want to fund bubble gum research this year. I kind of want to so maybe we should,” it is not that. We are talking about big, huge things. Big important priorities that are countering each other and that people are invested in. But when it comes to something like biodefense, I think we have to do better, and the message of the Panel would be that we can do better.

I think the last point I will make before closing, and before my next colleague comes up, is just this: we are talking about Zika and we are talking about the Olympics today, but today we should also be asking, “What is the next thing coming down the pike?” Because obviously something else is coming down the pike. It is not “We are done after the Olympics and Zika.” Obviously we already know something is coming. Not *what* is it, but *how* do we address threats that are going to keep coming year after year, and perhaps more frequently? I think we have to look ahead, and we have to figure out how to take the information we actually already have and address it in advance, in a more efficient and effective way so that we can avoid being in this situation all the time.

One of the tragedies of this disease [Zika] is that it affects children so much. As a culture here in North America, and also in Central and South America, the value we place on children is enormous. That is not to say it is not like that everywhere in the world, but people have different perspectives elsewhere. Because we place so much value on that, because it breaks our hearts to see these pictures and to put ourselves in the position of those parents who are going to have to somehow raise these children and deal with their issues, this has become a very emotional issue for us. At the same time, now we have the Olympics, also a very emotional issue for most countries. It is a matter of patriotism and everything else. We are lucky – from the perspective of dealing with biological threats – we actually are lucky that we have two of these great

big emotional issues coming together because it is forcing a conversation that does not ordinarily occur.

But we are already running out of time. That we are talking about it with the Olympics in less than two months, this is not the way we should be conducting ourselves as countries and as members of the global community. We can do better than this, and I think we have to not only connect with the future, but also connect to the past. You know, the United States has been all over Central and South America for many, many decades. Our Special Forces have been down south for many, many decades. We need to pull all this experience and information and relationships we have developed and the science that we have together so that we can develop policy and execute it not just for us and the United States but for the entire hemisphere, if not for the whole rest of the world.

Dr. Tara Kirk Sell

*Member of the USA national swim team for eight years, served as captain for six national teams, and earned a silver medal at the 2004 Olympics in Athens. Currently an associate at the Center for Health Security at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center**

I have a background in public health, and as most of you know I was also an Olympic athlete; and actually, I have another perspective – until I had my baby less than three weeks ago, I was also a pregnant woman. So I had that perspective as well. I definitely think that there is a little bit of extra anxiety when thinking about Zika when you are pregnant.

I am also happy to go after Dr. Asha George because I am with the UPMC Center for Health Security - we used to be the Center for Bio Security at UPMC. I am really glad that you emphasized the biodefense and biothreat aspect of this and how important it is to really think about these threats in a long-term way so that we can think about how these infectious disease events are going to keep happening. We need to have a strategy to deal with them in the long run instead of saying at the last minute, “Let us try to take care of this.” When you think about Zika, we should have been working on it months and months ago – and the CDC was, but we needed to have more resources. So we need to think about how we can do that.

But I am going to focus on the relationship that people are drawing between Zika and the Olympics. I think it is good for us to talk about that, but a lot of people are calling for the Olympics to be postponed or canceled or moved. I think that is a little silly, honestly.

I think there is sort of this mental disconnect going on, right? “The Olympics are so big, and they are such a big deal and so many people are going to come, this is going to spread Zika all around the world. But it is not so big that we cannot just cancel it or move it - it is huge but nimble at the same time.” I do not think that the Olympics are a big enough event to cause this global catastrophe of Zika that some people have been talking about. I read that the travel to the Olympics represents less than 1 percent of the travel to all Zika-affected countries.

I guess I have a different perspective because I was there and I know all the events that run up to it. The diving trial just finished, the swimming Olympic trials are starting on Sunday, there are a whole series of events that come together to make the Olympics happen. It is not just people having a competition at a venue and then that is it. There are all these other events that are happening locally around that event that are going on with the sponsors and other parties that are doing things together in that area.

The other thing that I wanted to touch on here is balancing risks. We do not really live in a risk-free world, although some of us like to think that we do. We accept some risks. We get in a car and we drive and we accept that there is a possibility of a car crash. But there are certain things that make people perceive some risks as more

* This presentation was delivered at an event on “Latin American Security Challenges: From the Olympics to Zika” held on June 23, 2016, at the International Law Institute.

serious than others. This is risk perception theory. One of those things is threats to future generations. So that is one of the reasons why Zika really pushes people's buttons, why people get really concerned about it, because it is a threat to unborn children.

I think that in public health there is a lot of push to go with an abundance of caution. That phrase, "out of an abundance of caution," personally I feel like if you hear it, it is usually a cover for doing something dumb. It is like saying, "this action is not really warranted by science, but we are going to do it anyways, just because." Do things that make sense. Do things that the science calls for and then stop there.

I talked a little bit about the anxiety that I had when I was pregnant. Even though the risk was tiny, I will say that I still was worried, I still had that elevation in risk perception. I was worried about the tiny, tiny, tiny chance that I might get bit by a mosquito that had a minuscule chance of having bitten someone else who had Zika. I was worried about it, so I can understand that concern.

And then there is also my perspective as an athlete. People would be worried about going to the Olympics and getting Zika. But as we heard from Professor Simon, as a disease, if you are not pregnant, there is not a ton of risk. And there are not going to be that many pregnant athletes, right? If you have trained all your life for an event, and you have lived your life in a way to target this one event, and you have made your life decisions based on this event, I do not really see the value of having someone else make a blanket public health decision that takes away your dream. Even if it is delayed, your training schedule is set up. If you lose your chance, you lose your chance pretty much for forever and there goes all of the last four years of training.

To finish up I will say that none of this is meant to say that Zika is not a serious concern. It is something that the world needs to pay attention to and that the U.S. needs to have an appropriate response to, but I would say that the relationship between Zika and the Olympics and calls for it to be canceled or moved or delayed are a little bit overblown.

The Post-Castro Era: Security Assessments


Professor Margaret Hayes

*Former Director of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at National Defense University, senior staff on the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and visiting fellow at the Center for Naval Analyses. She also held appointments at Johns Hopkins University and George Mason University. Currently, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and Vice President of Evidence Based Research, Inc.**

We are neighbors of Latin America. We need to understand our neighbors better. Why do refugees seek to come? Why the Petrobras scandal? How can we help Colombia realize the promise of peace after 50 years of struggle? Why do the region's economies seem not to thrive? I am not persuaded that the passing of Fidel is going to make much difference in the region now. Cuba has many problems of its own. It must deal with an underperforming economy, with a new government. The Castro brothers are no longer in the vanguard. The question will be – not right now, but once Raul Castro passes from the scene – what happens to the internal politics of Cuba?

The Castros aside, the rest of the hemisphere suffers indeed from profound insecurities. These “insecurities” were identified in presentations and discussions before the new OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security over the decade of the 1990s (Table 1).

Table 1: Insecurities in our Hemisphere



* This presentation was delivered at an event on “Latin America's Security Outlook: Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-Castro Era” held on December 16, 2016, at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

After a long delay, they were incorporated to the 2003 OAS Multidimensional Security Declaration, which emphasizes cooperative security in the region and human security – the rights of individuals, the need for safety, community, and collaboration between the nations of the region. However, the “insecurities” continue to be of concern and require our attention and analysis. Obviously, drug trafficking and the transnational organized crime that facilitates drug trafficking are near the top of the list of concerns. But the pervasive and increasingly obvious corruption in many of the governments, headlined by the recent Petrobras and Odebrecht scandals in Brazil, are of equal concern. The failure of the legal institutions to function efficiently or effectively, and the failure of governments to exercise the basic tasks of managing the economies, providing education, health services, infrastructure, and encouraging good jobs are the things that really plague the region and that contribute to the unacceptable levels of violence and inequality that plague too many of the countries in the region.

For these reasons, I argue that we must focus on the quality of *governance* in the hemisphere. Poor and ineffective governance underlies much of what ails the region.

Many years ago, the World Bank undertook to understand why, with all the money that the Bank was lending into Africa, countries did not develop? Its effort resulted in a seminal document, Governance and Development,¹³ which defined governance as “the exercise of authority, control, management, and power of government,” or “the manner in which power (form of government, process, capacity to manage) is exercised in the management of a country’s economic, social resources for development.” Good governance, for the Bank “is synonymous with sound development management,” and the combination of “the procedures, the organization, the rules, regulations, and laws that *yield good results* in the execution of tasks of government, and the economic and efficient employment of national resources.” Governance issues are still an important focus of Bank attention and research – indeed the 2017 World Development Report¹⁴ addresses governance. Governance is one of the central weaknesses of many countries in our region – a weakness that contributes importantly to its persistent insecurity. Only Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama rank in the top quartile of nations on the Bank’s government effectiveness indicator. Most others rank in the lower half of the index while Venezuela ranks very near the very bottom of the ranking.¹⁵

Governance requires *voice for the public* and *accountability by government agencies*.... In our region, poor governance is reflected in the failure to address the development needs of large segments of population – poor schools, lack of sanitation, infrastructure and State presence in teeming urban neighborhoods, and perverse economic policies that discourage investment and job creation. Too often, the State is controlled by an elite with little interest in the welfare of the non-elite population and few incentives to pay the taxes that would make it possible to address social deficits. Given the lack of opportunity to earn a living, trafficking and extortion become attractive ways to survive and migration a way to escape.

¹³ World Bank, Governance and Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1992)

¹⁴ World Bank: Governance and the Law: World Development Report 2017 (World Bank 2017).

¹⁵ See <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators>.

Crime and violence impose heavy costs on fragile societies. The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that crime-related costs are equal on average to between 3.55 percent and 2.41 percent of GDP for countries in the region. For Honduras the figure is 6.51 percent. El Salvador 6.16, Brazil 3.78, Chile 2.77, and Mexico 1.92. Social costs include costs of victimization and income foregone (0.64 percent GDP); private spending on security by families and businesses (1.37 percent GDP), and government expenditures on police, prisons, and the judiciary (1.51 percent GDP). For each sector, the costs of crime and violence represent foregone investments in other potentially more beneficial activities. The Bank estimates these to be between US\$115 and US\$171 billion for the region,¹⁶ a non-trivial amount.

Governments are not providing the policies and programs needed to promote development. Too often this is because government itself is controlled (“captured”) by elements, especially the wealthy and business communities, that don’t want to pay the taxes that would permit the extension of roads or provision of schools and clinics in remote areas, or in dense, poor urban clusters. Governments are not doing what economists argue is necessary to promote economic activities. The assembly operations established in Central America in the 1980s and 1990s have left those countries. Brazil and other commodity producers did not invest the profits of the recent boom in the infrastructure that could have permitted both expanded industry and increased exports from the agrarian interior. The boom over, growth has slowed dramatically and public finances now do not permit the needed investment.

Latin American governments must examine the reasons why the World Economic Forum judges the countries “low in competitiveness” – and therefore not attractive to foreign investment. The WEF’s 2015-16 Competitiveness Report¹⁷ ranks 140 countries. Only Chile, at 35, ranks among the top 50 countries. Panama, Costa Rica and Mexico rank just below 50, while Brazil stands at 75, Argentina at 106 and Venezuela near the bottom at 132.

The themes that weigh most frequently and negatively on the region’s competitiveness rankings are: restrictive labor regulations, inadequately educated workforce, inefficient bureaucracy, inadequate infrastructure, high tax rates, and corruption. These are all issues that effective governments should be addressing, both to attract foreign investment and to promote domestic economic development.

Corruption, in particular, has recently become so visible in the region that publics in several countries are finally beginning to call for change. The Panama Papers scandal, the FIFA scandal, the downfall and ousting of Guatemala’s president in a corruption scandal, and Brazil’s scandals involving kickbacks to politicians and corporations from State-financed Petrobras projects (often with substantial cost overruns) and recently the revelation that the country’s largest construction firms have paid substantial bribes to officials in other countries to win contracts. Odebrecht’s corporate bribery has now involved leaders in both Colombia and Peru. Slowly,

¹⁶ At 2014 exchange rates.

¹⁷ <http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-2016/>

countries are beginning to react to the endemic Grand Corruption.¹⁸ While the public seeks change, governments resist, because too many in government are the beneficiaries.

The crime, violence, corruption, impunity and limited opportunities to escape these contribute to a perverse “community decay” – separation of families, distrust of the police, deterioration of the environment, and absence of economic activity. Gangs become the family for young people in Central America or in the slums of Rio, because the parents, aunts and uncles, have left for the United States or other countries or cities to seek a job when jobs are not available in their home community or country. The youth left behind do not see a future in their own country. Several years ago, the Central Bank of El Salvador conducted a survey that found that teenagers’ main goal as they looked to the future was to leave El Salvador and go to another country – to the United States, especially – in order to get a job and escape the violence and lack of opportunity in their home environment.

But this community decay; the breakdown of families; the absence of public services like schools or health clinics; the lack of trust in the police; the fact that the police are so ill-prepared, poorly resourced and trained: all these issues cause countries to call in the military without preparing them for urban operations.¹⁹ This community and family decay contributes to lack of trust in the State and in one’s neighbors, and contributes to the formation of substitute families: gangs in many of the cities, in particular. The availability of the gang organization is contributing to drug trafficking and to profound extortion, particularly in Central America. The gangs in Central America are not “cartels” but “mafias of the poor” as the *New York Times* recently reported, in the describing the extortion activities of gangs in Central America.²⁰

Donor institutions are seeking to provide community activities that will provide an alternative life to some of these youth, and with some successes. But the governments themselves are too often failing to develop consensus among elites and are not adopting many of the suggestions that USAID, the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and others suggest. The campaign for change must belong to the governments and their publics.

All is not negative in the region. There are some good stories. Ciudad Juárez, on the U.S. border of Mexico, had a kind of resurgence. A mayor who took it upon himself to really address the problems of local community coordination and to attend to

¹⁸ “Grand corruption is the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society. It often goes unpunished.” (Transparency Intl)

¹⁹ We have learned in the United States and in peace missions around the world that untrained militaries are poor substitutes for effective police.

²⁰ Killers on a Shoestring: Inside the Gangs of El Salvador”
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/americas/el-salvador-drugs-gang-ms-13.html?_r=0

activities in the different parts of the community was able to resolve a good bit of the gang violence in that community.²¹ But there is far too little of this kind of activity.

Countries are beginning to cooperate with each other. The Central Americans have signed the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle, which is hopefully going to promote the coordination of efforts, including economic efforts but also border control and law enforcement efforts among the three countries, and hope to begin to push down the level of violence and the volume of drugs that move through the region. Guatemala's UN-sponsored (and U.S.-backed) International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) has set an example of international collaboration in strengthening legal frameworks, the judiciary, and public prosecutors. More needs to be done, but public support is strong for continuing the efforts to address crime and corruption in the public arena. Honduras has recently adopted a similar project – CICIH. A Colombian jurist heads CICIG and enjoys high approval among the Guatemalan population.

The Colombia peace process is a positive. Colombia has one of the stronger governments in South America. Unfortunately, that government does not do very well getting out of Bogotá and the main cities. It has begun to work to extend the capacity of the state to remote areas, but doing so will take time. It was fascinating that the referendum in support of the peace accord was defeated by low turnout in precisely the areas of the country where support for peace and an end of violence were the highest.²² Those were also the areas of the country where the government presence was weak and the value of participation in the poll not fully appreciated.

Lieutenant General Ken Keen, who was the Deputy Commander of U.S. Southern Command and the Commander of U.S. Joint Task Force in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, wrote that, in view of his experience, the new C2 (Command and Control) should be Coordination and Collaboration. That is a good way to think about what these generally poorly integrated countries are beginning to do and beginning to see that they need to do. There is quite a bit of positive collaboration among the militaries, as we saw in response to the Haiti earthquake. Recently, Peru and Chile, long-time rivals, began holding joint disaster response exercises, a very positive move, particularly in the aftermath of Peru's difficult response to its own earthquake in 2014. While the militaries are cooperating much more, other areas of government – the police, the courts, the border control – are not doing nearly enough, and we need to see more of that.

Other challenges in the region include Venezuela, currently with one of the weakest governments, weakest economies and high rates of insecurity. Under Hugo Chavez and his successor Maduro, Venezuela has been experiencing a “disestablishment” of its democratic system. How will Venezuela – once this current crisis passes, if it ever does – put the country back together again? How do you put Humpty Dumpty back

²¹ See Steven Dudley and Sandra Rodriguez, “Civil Society, Governance and the Development of Citizen Security,” Washington: Wilson Center 2013.

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Dudley_Rodriguez_Civil_Society_Border.pdf

²² See Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, “Abstención,” in

<http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/opinion/columna/fernando-cepeda-ulloa/abstencion>

together when the government has totally undermined institutions and legal traditions, changed the laws, and so forth?

Brazil confronts enormous challenges in addressing the endemic corruption that has been revealed in the recent scandals. Its challenge is that the corruption must be ended by the very people who are profiting and taking advantage of the opportunities for corruption, i.e. the legislators, the politicians, and bureaucrats. This is going to be difficult.

We North Americans also need to be quite aware that a great deal of the money-making traffic is moving toward the United States in the form of marijuana, cocaine, and heroin, increasingly from Mexico, while the arms trade goes the opposite direction. U.S. demand for drugs makes us a contributing party to the security crisis. We have, for that reason, an obligation to participate, to do what we can to help resolve some of these problems. They are problems not just of dealing with controlling gang violence or transnational organized crime. They are problems that most profoundly are related to the poor, the ineffective government, and the lack of rule of law that exists in many of the countries.

Without the glue of faith in one's government and good performance on the part of the government and its institutions, it is going to be very hard to deal with the questions of transnational organized crime, gang violence, corruption, impunity, etc. The emphasis on good and effective governance is key and critical. How do countries build that? I once asked an Argentine economist working at the World Bank, "What did you learn in primary and secondary school about what is democracy, how your government ought to work, and about the responsibilities of governments and of citizens? What are the expected rules of the game?" My friend chuckled and said, "You know, I think we shot all those professors...." That was black humor, but the question remains something we must ask as we work with the region. What do young people, whether they are in good schools or bad schools, learn about how government should perform? What are responsibilities of government and equally important, what are the responsibilities of citizens? We all must ask ourselves: What can we do, what *are* we doing to help communities institutionalize good governance?

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I return to the theme, “Challenges and Opportunity in the Post-Castro Era,” which I shall raise in the context of Venezuela. Venezuela has become a Cuban security state with Cubans providing military intelligence, doctors, and nurses in exchange for Venezuelan oil. The existence of the “security state” and the economic and political problems that affect primarily the Venezuelan people are a concern not only for the hemisphere but also for us here in the United States.

There are four issues to be analyzed. First, how does “Cubazuela” – Cuba, Venezuela – the so-called single government, single country, separate the one from the other? Second, what was Cuba’s role in the creation of this “security state” and how is that role unraveling today? Third, what options are there for the Venezuelan people to undo the old regime and repair the political and economic situation? And finally, what is the role of the international community, including the United States?

To provide background, when Colonel Hugo Chávez was elected into office in 1998, he introduced Bolivarian socialism, defined as the dedication of the state to bring about greater equality, and to transfer wealth from the rich to the poor in housing, transportation, medical help, and education, so that those who were deprived in previous decades would be able to assert their rights as Venezuelan people. Chavez died in 2013 and was succeeded by the Cuban selected heir, Nicolás Maduro, a former union leader working for a bus company, and a man trained politically in Havana. Maduro had neither the charisma nor the smarts, nor any economic grounding, with which to lead the Venezuelan people.

Today, according to the IMF, Venezuela has inflation at 180 percent. The IMF anticipates that with inflation in November 2016 at 58 percent, the inflation rate for 2017 will be over 600 percent. All of us can recall from our history the impact that runaway inflation had in Germany and the Weimar Republic. In Venezuela the result is diminished support and trust in government from ordinary Venezuelan citizens.

In the political realm, many members of a divided opposition decided not to participate in legislative elections in 2005. This meant that the Chávez party, the PSUV took control of the legislature and with that control stacked the Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal. Consequently, concentrated power lies in the presidency with minimum if any check or balance from the legislature and judiciary. Maduro inherited that authoritarian structure in 2013 and soon afterwards faced both political and economic crises. The latest political crisis is the significant win by opposition parties, known as the *Mesa de unidad* in the legislative elections of December 15, 2015. With a two-third majority in the national assembly, the opposition was able to

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unite disparate political factions into a single purpose, namely to demand a recall referendum, or what we would call impeachment. President Maduro resisted. He urged the Supreme Court to deny that recall referendum on the grounds of fraud, despite the fact that the opposition succeeded in gaining 1.8 million votes in favor of this referendum. The Supreme Court obeyed and denied the right of the legislature to call for the referendum, despite the constitutional right to do so. Furthermore, the Electoral Tribunal has not only denied that referendum, but has rejected elections in December 2016 for mayors and state governments. In other words, Constitutional government, legislative participation, and electoral democracy are presently dead in Venezuela.

At the same time, food is very short and medicines are not to be found. The police control the inventory and guard the hospitals so that any new medication, antibiotics, anesthesia, bandages are protected. But they also allow their friends to enter the hospital with the purpose of stealing and reselling much sought after medical supplies.

The Venezuelan people are hurting to a degree different from Syria but equivalent in terms of human suffering. Violence has resulted in an intentional homicide rate of 90 per 100,000, the worst in the world, except for Syria. It compares with 25 years ago when it was only 8-10 per 100,000 people. In other words, the Venezuelan state has collapsed.

What does the Cuban leadership, who in 2007 proclaimed, "We are a single government a single country," do now? In 2007, it favored that unity because subsidized Venezuelan oil enabled and supported the Cuban economy. However, today Venezuelan subsidized oil no longer arrives in the same quantities. In 2008, Venezuela provided 115,000 barrels per day. In November 2016 it provided 55,000 barrels per day. The last Venezuelan tanker to dock at the port and unload Venezuelan oil was in August, 2016. Consequently, the Cuban leadership has recognized that Venezuela can no longer be helpful to them. They have therefore recalled Cuban doctors and nurses, but still maintain their intelligence apparatus in Venezuela. Nevertheless, the deteriorating economy led Castro to recognize that Venezuela's capacity to provide economic support has dwindled significantly and could continue downward. As a result the Cuban government is separating itself from the doomed Venezuelan government.

Venezuela's support for Cuban socialism provides the island with a bulwark against the United States and its allies in the region. Both Fidel and Raul Castro invested time in Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro. They supported them with intelligence units that taught the Venezuelans how to exercise control over their people. Those intelligence units established oversight committees in the local communities and rewarded those who spied on citizens for the government's sake. People who expressed critical opinions, or planned to demonstrate for freedoms or food were taken off to police stations for varying lengths of time. None of them returned to continue opposing the government. Many never returned. For the time being, Raul

Castro has an interest in maintaining the leadership of Nicolás Maduro and continues to guide intelligence and security units. However, the deteriorating economy is leading Castro to recognize that economic support has dwindled. We therefore note the commencement of a Cuban separation from the doomed Venezuelan economy and state.

When Fidel died in November 2016, Nicolás Maduro attended the funeral, sat on Raul's left and cried. He then said, "We, the Venezuelan people will continue on with Fidel's work. The Bolivarian Socialist revolution will continue." People wondered, with what! As we see Cuba separate itself from Venezuela and shift towards a greater reliance on American tourism and international investment, we ask what can the Venezuelan people do, and what are they doing, to resolve the situation?

Some believe that once again the students should go back into the streets to demonstrate. Among the more extreme faction of the *Mesa de unidad* there are those who would like to bring down the Maduro regime through public demonstrations. But this risks violence on a huge scale, because the state not only has the National Guard, the military, and the police, but also the *colectivos*. These are young men and women who put on a uniform for the occasion, and then take out their motorbikes to slash and harm ordinary citizens. They create enormous fear in the communities. Today, violence is widespread, and the government can deny the existence of state-supported violence, because the *colectivos* are not part of the state apparatus.

There is a hope that the Venezuelan military, which has a tradition of upholding constitutional law, will not allow this violence to continue or grow. Will it stop the *colectivos* and restrain the police? Will it put itself between the demonstrators and the government to achieve some calm? This hope relies upon mid-level officers, because many of the current military leaders have been coopted by their participation in the drug trade. They are now participants in the transfer of cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine through Venezuelan ports to Africa and then northward into Europe. To a lesser degree, they also ship drugs into the United States. Consequently, there is no certainty that senior levels of the military might act as a restraining force.

Others within the *Mesa de unidad* believe that discussion and dialogue are the only way forward. They have been helped by Undersecretary of State, Tom Shannon, and the Vatican, who in October 2016 asked Maduro to enter into negotiations with the opposition to seek a solution. Members of the *Mesa de unidad* demanded two things: recognition of the constitutional right to hold a recall referendum, and the release of political prisoners. Estimated numbers of political prisoners are now in the hundreds. Many of them are hauled into jail for only a matter of three or four days, but they were treated in such inhumane ways during those days that when released they retreat into the family and their homes, fearful of being exposed once again to that brutality.

Since October 20, 2016, the moderate wing of the opposition has participated in negotiations brokered by former presidents of Spain, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, but negotiations have gone nowhere. Maduro has stalled at each point with

the result that in mid-December the opposition said it was not worth its while to remain at the table. It announced that it would not participate in the next meeting. Under pressure from the Undersecretary Shannon and the three former presidents, Maduro agreed to keep the negotiating table open until January 17th, which conveniently is seven days after the constitutional deadline for a recall referendum. After that date, the Constitution does not allow a recall referendum. Instead, the Vice President assumes leadership of the government and remains until the next presidential election in April 2018. On January 4, 2017, Maduro appointed Tareck El Aissami as his new Vice President, transferring to him significant powers.

In other words, Maduro has decided to protect his regime even if he has to resign. This suggests that it is members of the regime who cling to power, because once they lose their immunity from prosecution as government officials, they will be exposed to criminal charges for drug trafficking, abuse of human rights, and other international crimes.

What is the international community doing? The Argentines have taken the lead. They have said to Venezuela, you are no longer acceptable within Mercosur, the regional grouping of South American trading countries, because of your rejection of democratic principles and the rule of law. The Venezuela's presidency of Mercosur was suspended and replaced pro-tem by Argentina. An incident in Buenos Aires reflected the tension between Venezuela and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil. In December 2016, when the Venezuelan foreign minister, Delcy Rodriguez, appeared to assume her chair of Mercosur, she was not allowed into the meeting room. Jostling between her security and the Argentinian security took place outside the room, and she claimed to have been pushed to the floor. Whether or not she went down, there is no doubt that there was pressure on her to move away from the room where Mercosur was meeting. The clear intent was to reject Venezuela's representative.

Without the members of Mercosur, who supports the Venezuelan government? Nicaragua remains a friend. Bolivia remains a friend. But neither country has the capacity to support Venezuela's economy as it spirals downward.

So finally, what should we in the United States and President-Elect Trump do?

There are no easy solutions. Overt engagement justifies Maduro's claims that the *Mesa de unidad* is no more than a puppet of Washington. Doing too little provides room for Maduro to jail his political opponents and rule with impunity. Some way in between must be found, preferably with the support of Venezuela's neighbors in South America.

I suggest that in the same way as Donald Trump had a telephone call with Tsai Ing-wen, the President of Taiwan, this is the time for a telephone call to the leadership of the *Mesa de unidad*. It is time to state U.S. support for the opposition, knowing that Maduro will use it to say the United States is in connivance with the *Mesa de unidad*. However, the U.S. government needs to stand up for democratic values, the rule of

law, and the fair treatment of its citizens. We cannot stand by and merely watch the rupture of democratic practice and maltreatment of citizens. We should not tolerate the humanitarian crisis. Our Secretary of State-Elect, Rex Tillerson, the former CEO of ExxonMobil, knows well the situation in Venezuela, as the company's assets were appropriated and its contracts reneged. In 2014, ExxonMobil won a suit for damages worth \$1.4billion against the Venezuelan national oil company, PDVSA. We have a Secretary of State-Elect who knows the situation in Venezuela and we have a President-Elect who is prepared to change some of the traditional postures of U.S. foreign policy. Now is the time to turn the "dialogue effort" into real pressure on the Maduro regime. Targeted sanctions on senior members of the government and military for participation in the drug trade would demonstrate that the United States knows who breaks the law and will seek to attach their bank accounts internationally. There are financial measures that the U.S. Treasury can take. Finally, we should consider ways to meet the humanitarian needs of hungry and malnourished citizens.

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What I want to do is talk about several issues concerning transnational organized crime, arms, drugs, and migration; touch on some of the geographical issues; and then focus on the need to build a better hemispheric framework for international enforcement cooperation.

It is challenging for the new administration because of the campaign discussion of tougher border walls, some of the derogatory remarks about Mexicans, and also the need to renegotiate NAFTA and some of the discussion against free trade. I think, at the beginning of the administration it would be good for the new administration to call the Latin American leaders together and to sit down and listen to them, and have a dialogue about what is needed in terms of hemispheric security and all of the other issues.

Let me now focus on some of the issues, starting with arms. We have already heard about the arms problem. And the U.S. is clearly the leading source of arms, not only in the hemisphere but in the world.

There have been two important treaties. The 1997 Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials: 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries have ratified it. The U.S. signed in 1997, it was sent to the Senate, and it has not been ratified. You also have the UN Arms Trade Treaty of April 2013: 20 Western Hemispheric countries have signed that. That treaty, by the way, pertains to trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks and combat aircraft to warships. It entered into force on December 24, 2014. The U.S. signed, but again the Senate has done nothing.

Drugs are a problem. One initiative of many countries in the region, including the U.S., is to find ways for non-incarceration treatment of people who just use drugs. The Organization of American States (OAS) itself has had a project on the initiatives in the region and world for non-incarceration treatment of persons using drugs. I think more needs to be done hemispherically in terms of exploring that initiative, and the U.S. needs to do more with respect to the demand side of drugs.

In terms of migration, there have been some good initiatives already. Dr. Hayes referred to the Alliance for Prosperity. The U.S. and the countries in Central America have had a very broad public education campaign. Also, there have been changes in the laws. For instance, now if you want to apply for asylum, you do not have to come here to do that. You can do that from those countries in Central America. That is an

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effort to reduce the amount of migration because that is where a lot of people are kidnapped and killed.

But the cartels have broadened the types of crimes in which they are engaged. First it was drugs but now there is a lot of trafficking of persons and all kinds of other crimes. One of the initiatives that were useful that was done in the Clinton Administration was the use of sanctions against both transnational organized crime and narco-kingpins. One thing that could be tried is more effort to get other countries to go along with those sanctions so that they are not just unilateral.

Migration is a problem in the hemisphere. The fact that the U.S. has not had a comprehensive immigration policy for the longest time has had an adverse impact on the region. Another problem with respect to security is that there has been a lot of deportation of hardened criminals and it has happened in most cases without any notice and without any planning. When you dump 200 or a thousand hardened criminals on fragile states that have no capacity to deal with them, what happens is these criminals who have not even been in their countries for most of their lives end up doing more violence, and then they transfer their know-how to their friends. And guess what? Not only does it destabilize those countries, but because they know the U.S., they often target their criminality back to the U.S., whether it is trafficking of humans, stolen or embezzled cars and aircrafts, drug trafficking, or whatever. So the U.S. needs to do more of what it has done with Haiti. With Haiti, it notifies Haiti and helps Haiti to mitigate the situation and plan for reintegrating the persons the U.S. deports.

Well, looking at a couple of countries, because this panel is entitled "Challenges and Opportunities in the Post-Castro Era," I think I need to say a few words about the U.S. relationship with Cuba. One of the biggest problems for the U.S. in the region has been that at every regional meeting the number one question has to do with Cuba and the fact that Cuba has been isolated. That has changed since December 17, 2014. There have been 11 agreements concluded between the U.S. and Cuba dealing with everything from narcotics enforcement and migration, to environmental cooperation. Even before the new initiative to normalize relations, historically relations between Cuba and the U.S., when they have improved or sometimes presaging improvement, have concerned enforcement cooperation, such as exchange of hijackers, spies, and political prisoners. Two very positive developments between the U.S. and Cuba is that Cuba has been in the forefront of dealing with hemispheric security. Cuba has sponsored the peace talks in Colombia with the FARC. In addition, Cuba has been very helpful with respect to relief to Haiti in the aftermath of the earthquakes and hurricanes. Cuba has used its doctors to give a lot of assistance.

I think because of the shortage of time, let me turn now to the need for better hemispheric framework in terms of enforcement. Here, clearly the most important body has been the Organization of American States. There has been a group called the Inter-American Juridical Committee that meets twice a year to make recommendations on laws and policies. There has been in the last ten or 15 years a new group, REMJA, Reuniones de Ministros de Justicia de las Americas, or Procuradores o Fiscales Generales de las Américas, basically the attorneys general or ministers of justice. They meet every other year and make recommendations for new agreements and policies, and they have done a lot of good work. But the problem is it

is not an organic organization or self-standing agency. It depends on the OAS Permanent Council for its marching orders, the drafts of its resolutions and proposals, and its budget, and so it really cannot do much without help. Some of the other entities having to do with enforcement in the OAS are more organic, like the CICAD (the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission) and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).

What is needed is an Americas Committee on Crime Problems. This would be a committee that would have its own institution and would be composed of lawyers, diplomats, and criminologists, and it would meet every day and would consider and take action against the “bad guys” on all the threats, while providing some of the solutions, whether they be making uniform laws, treaties, and/or creating new mechanisms and institutions. And this is not something out of Mars. There has been something like this since 1958. The Council of Europe has a European Committee on Crime Problems, and that is what it does. It meets every day and it focuses on the different threats. It has produced over 100 conventions on enforcement, many of which the U.S. has joined (e.g., Convention on the Transfer of Prisoners).

So, to be successful, the enforcement agencies have to network as well as the criminals. In order to have successful enforcement regimes and networks, we need to be more proactive in terms of hemispheric cooperation.

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In a 1994 interview with Fidel Castro led by Anne Louise Bardach, a reporter for *Vanity Fair*, Fidel expressed the view that after his death nothing would happen. The country, the Party, and the Government would quickly adapt to the situation. Fidel said that “all of political, legal and institutional mechanisms exist to confront the situation when it arises. The life of the country will not stop for a single minute. There is no indispensable man anywhere in this world, and even less in this country.”

For many of us, the so-called “Castro revolution” that began in 1959 has been a permanent threat to the development of Cuban democratic institutions and a continuous detriment to the economic and social development of this country. It has also been a permanent failure in the projection of insurrections that Castro wanted to export to the majority of Latin American countries. Che Guevara died in the hands of the Bolivian military. The trips of Fidel Castro to Chile, where he was accompanied by intelligence services similar to that of the East German Stasi, only accelerated the coup d'état against President Allende.

His relationship with “montoneros” of Argentina and the “Tupamaros” of Uruguay didn't produce any political or military results, but contributed to Operation Condor that, through many years, created a severe repression in the hands of the militaries of Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.

In the same way, his protection of ETA terrorists only further spoiled Cuba-Spain relations, Spain being a country that always maintained good bilateral relations with Cuba even during the dictatorship of General Franco.

His support, though more theoretical than practical, of the Shining Path in Peru, also wasn't beneficial. And his adventures in Africa were a disaster after having lost a significant amount of men and resources, which produced a purge among his “high-ranking commanders” (including Generals De la Guardia and Ochoa).

Castro managed to subsist thanks to the initial support of the Soviet Union, and subsequently by a skilled diplomacy that managed to connect with the left of Latin America. He led Cuba to export doctors to Venezuela in exchange for oil contracts, and maintained relations with Brazil and Ecuador that allowed for support in international organizations, in exchange for small concessions.

The last two decades were characterized by the rise of the left in Latin America. The extreme left led by Hugo Chavez and Maduro in Venezuela has been authoritarian, anti-American, and also against the present government of Spain. Furthermore, it strengthened alliances with rogue states such as Iran, as well as with terrorist groups including the Colombian FARC and Hezbollah.

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Due to these reasons, the death of Fidel Castro will not create any significant political turbulence or geopolitical clashes in the hemisphere. *Sic transit gloria mundi*. Fidel was cremated just six days ago, but no one is even talking about Fidel anymore. Cuba, today only has limited influence with Bolivarian states, especially Venezuela. The rest of Bolivarian states, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, limit themselves to purely maintaining the same Castro rhetoric by manifesting their contempt for Human Rights.

In relation to Bolivia, I would like to take this opportunity to denounce the repeated, persistent, and willful violation of human rights by the plurinational State of Bolivia. Morales has absolute power and control of the three branches of government, whose purpose is to carry out illicit procedures, law suits against ministers of the supreme court and judges of the constitutional court, and even coercion against those who defended the independence of the judiciary.

Sadly, the demands against these abuses that are submitted before the Commission of Human Rights of the OAS are rarely studied and many times not even processed through its bureaucracy.

The evolution of ideological blocs have been, as we said, consolidated before the dictator's passing.

In regard to citizen security, we find ourselves at this point in time with Central American and South American countries whose levels of security are extremely low, and with populations in risk. I am referring specifically to cases such as Honduras, El Salvador, and Venezuela. We also cannot deem "secure" a large part of Mexican territory.

Brazil has frankly not improved its level of security, and many urban areas in Argentina also suffer from a lack of security and poor police protection.

Despite the peace agreements between the Colombian government and the FARC, citizen security in this country cannot be qualified as positive. There are still kidnappings that are, in nature, non-attributable to guerrilla groups, but to common criminality without knowing for certain whether these crimes are influenced directly or indirectly by former components of guerrillas or paramilitaries.

Concerning criminal organizations, the case in Mexico is known, by and large. Organized crime, funded by narcotics, has severely hit Mexican society. Despite the actions taken by the different governments, criminal networks are intertwined in their political and administrative world. The international community must support the legislative, judicial, and executive actions that Mexico adopts, through an effective coordination of intelligence work. Furthermore, it is imperative to prioritize reducing the consumption of illegal drugs in countries that have high levels of such imports, particularly the United States and the European Union.

The social and political development in countries, and its immediate consequences such as economic stability, labor stability, and maintaining an adequate level of overall well-being, are all factors that are taken account for when the country is gifted with judicial security mechanisms. This can be found through a system of rule of law

that guarantees not only the security of investments, the protection of dividends and transactions through royalties, technical and professional assistance, and general know-how, but also by at least a minimum of existing security for the citizens that allows an easy daily living and subsistence, free from sabotages, political strikes, kidnappings, threats, or attacks against property or persons.

Let us now consider a variety of project-specific countries. The Hemisphere is changing its political spectrum. Brazil, Argentina and Peru have governments of the center-right, and Colombia is entering a stable political period.

CHINA

China, who became a member of the Inter-American Development Bank and the Inter-American Investment Corporation with full support of the United States and the European Union (among others), has increased its economic and strategic presence in the region, raising its leverage.

PERU

Peru merits special attention because of its investments in infrastructure and defense. Thirteen railroad projects to boost the country's development will demand total investments of \$26,776 billion according to the Lima Chamber of Commerce Institute of Economics and Business Development. Also, agro-exports hit their second highest number in October.

However this favorable economic situation does not allow us to let up our guard. The economic inequalities subsist, and the threat of the Shining Path remains somewhat alive. They are the reason that the Peruvian government decided to purchase "strykers" to enhance its forces and multi-role equipment for border security, disaster response, and confrontation of destabilizing internal threats. We suppose that the prime contractor will be General Dynamics Land Systems. The buy would contribute to Peru's plan of building a multi-dimensional brigade by 2030. Chile and Colombia also have expressed interest in the rights.

MEXICO

The winds of protectionism and isolation are blowing, but I don't think that they will disrupt the passage of what has been happening in Latin American to this date with the progressive integration of its economies and the commercial relations and investments of Asian countries. Likewise, and in relation to Mexico, we will expect a pragmatic position. It is going to be challenging to ignore the close relationship between Mexico and the U.S. After the North American elections we can detect a political and diplomatic proximity between the two countries that is not foreign to NAFTA.

Whatever happens in Latin America affects the regional security, economic prosperity, and stability of the United States, as well as of Spain, given that country's investment in the region. Altogether, Latin American goods make up more than 40 percent of the United States's exports, with the U.S. being the source of 65 percent of

its imports, and Latin America is the territory of natives or descendants representing 17 percent of the U.S.'s population. We have been able to ascertain that there are many contractual opportunities in Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil. But I repeat, there will never be contractual fluidity without the assurance of greater legal security.

EU

The European Union has just signed the “Dialogue of Politics and Cooperation” agreement with the Republic of Cuba, which substitutes for the denominated common position that was adopted in 1996. This entails a removal of the blockade and the beginning of serious negotiations to create a stable framework of political relationships through dialogue, cooperation, and commerce with a basis of mutual respect, reciprocity, common interest, and the respect of state sovereignty. The relationships will be oriented to sustain the process of modernization of the economy and Cuban society through bilateral cooperation and international forums, with the aim of strengthening human rights, democracy, the fight against discrimination, and the achievement of the objective of sustainable development. There exists an essential clause for respect of human rights.

U.S.

It is to be expected that the initial rapprochement between Cuba and the United States continues to advance and allows them to be instruments of cooperation and development of serious safeguard clauses that will allow for a pacific transition in the island as well as ensure that Cuban society becomes part of the political and multilateral institutions.

It is possible that new forms of populism may appear, and not due to a Castro-led influence—but we must be sure that the only thing that will allow for sustainable development and economic redistribution is diligence in respect for the rule of law.

Anne Louise Bardach, the reporter whom I cited at the beginning of my speech, concluded her interview with Castro by asking him if he had heard a joke that was popular in the streets of Cuba at the time. He said he hadn't, and asked that she tell it to him.

She did, saying: “What are the triumphs of the revolution? Education, sports, and health. What are its faults? Breakfast, lunch, and dinner.” Castro laughed and said “Yet you see what happens when you have too many breakfasts, lunches, and dinners: it's bad for health.”

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

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